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In this paper we build a new and meaningful shareholder protection index for 
five countries and code the development of the law for over three decades. At-
tributing and comparing legal differences by numbers is contrary to the tradi-
tional way of doing comparative law and the use of a quantitative methodology 
to  account  for  variations  across  legal  systems  has  been  subjected  to  some 
searching criticisms. However, we believe that with a cautious approach, it has 
the potential to open new vistas of research in the area of comparative law and 
as such should not be shunned. This paper provides an illustration of the inter-
esting possibilities that diligent quantification of legal rules (‘leximetrics’) pro-
vides for comparing variations across time series and across legal systems. For 
instance, our study finds, that in all of our panel countries shareholder protec-
tion has been improving in the last three decades; that the protection of minority 
against majority shareholders is considerably stronger in ‘blockholder countries’ 
as compared to the non-blockholder countries and that convergence in share-
holder protection is taking place since 1993 and is increasing since 2001. Fi-
nally, our examination of the legal differences between the five countries does 
not confirm the distinction between common law and civil law countries.  
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The discussion on ‘shareholder protection’ has various dimensions: it is topical 
in the context of the EU Commission’s proposal to harmonise some aspects of 
shareholder rights in the EU.
1 It is significant for the consideration of good cor-
porate governance.
2 And time and again comes to the forefront in the growing 
literature on ‘law and finance’. Following the pioneering work of a group of fi-
nancial economists,
3 there is an increasing trend to quantify the law in relation 
to shareholder protection. However, in our view, this has not been done in a sat-
isfactory manner. Thus, Part II identifies some of the problems with the existing 
indices. Part III discusses the building of a more meaningful shareholder protec-
tion index for this paper, in particular it addresses, the question of selection of 
variables and method of coding. Part IV presents some of the results that are in-
dicative of interesting possibilities that a leximetric approach
4 opens up into the 
study of comparative shareholder protection law and Part V concludes.  
 
It is hoped that our results contribute to the contemporary discussion on com-
parative  company  law  and  corporate  governance.  Adopting  a  leximetric  ap-
proach, we have made some interesting findings on questions such as which of 
the studied countries scores the maximum on our shareholder protection index, 
how much legal systems have changed over the years, whether differences fol-
low the distinction into civil-law and common-law countries, and whether the 
laws on shareholder protection are converging or diverging.
5  
 
As a point of clarification, it should be noted that this paper is about ‘leximet-
rics’ and not ‘econometrics’. ‘Leximetrics’ can be understood as every quantita-
tive measurement of law. To be sure, the coding of shareholder rights can be the 
first part of an econometric study which seeks to find correlations between legal 
and economic data. Since this will, however, be part of a further study,
6 this pa-




II. The problems with existing indices 
 
The most popular shareholder protection index so far is the one constructed in 
La Porta et al’s article on ‘Law and Finance’.
7 This index uses eight variables as 
proxies for shareholder protection in 49 countries. These variables code the law 
for ‘one share one vote’, ‘proxy by mail allowed’, ‘shares not blocked before 






emptive rights to new issues’, ‘share capital required to call an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting’, and ‘mandatory dividend’.  
 
Since the publication of ‘Law and Finance’ in 1998 many studies have used 
these variables on shareholder protection.
8 However, as admitted in their most 
recent paper,
9 the initial index has also been subjected to many criticisms. For 
instance, Spamann, Cools and Braendle have criticised the ad hoc selection of 
variables and even found various coding errors.
10 Pistor has gone a step ahead 
and extended the number of variables in order to capture particular problems for 
the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
11 
 
To elaborate, the first problem is the very limited number of variables, which 
hardly provides a meaningful picture of the legal protection of shareholders.
12 
To be sure, one cannot take all aspects of shareholder protection into account. 
The company law of most countries consists of several hundred sections or arti-
cles, so that the coding of all the details would lead to an unworkable index of 
several hundred (or more like thousand) variables. Thus, it is indeed necessary 
to construct a limited number of variables. But the selection of variables must 
be intelligible and wide enough to function as a proxy for shareholder protection 
in general, which is not the case with La Porta et al’s eight variables. They do 
not fully capture the most significant aspects of the law.
13 For instance, although 
the variables for ‘one share one vote’, ‘proxy by mail allowed’, ‘shares not 
blocked before the meeting’, and ‘share capital required to call an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting’, deal with different aspects of shareholders’ voting power, 
they miss the more crucial question of the extent of this power, i.e. the issues 
over which the shareholders in a general meeting can exercise decision making 
power.
14 Similarly, while the variable ‘cumulative voting’ may be important to 
the extent that it seeks to measure the power of shareholders in appointment of 
directors, it misses the more critical question of removal of directors and the ex-
tent to which entrenchment is possible as also certain other aspects of the terms 
of directors, for example, their tenure, remuneration and so on.
15 Further, de-
spite using the term ‘anti-director index’
16, the variables do not address the as-
pects of law relating to issues such as composition of the board, extent of direc-
tor’s self dealing or their disqualification at all.
17 
 
Additionally, La Porta et al.’s choice of variables can be criticised as suffering 
from a US-bias.
18 On the one hand, this can be seen in the variables which have 
been included in the index. For instance, in the US the use of cumulative voting 
has been profoundly debated,
19 as a result of which some US states have ‘opt 
out’ and some have ‘opt in’ provisions in their corporate laws.
20 Therefore from 






regulation can be seen as a good proxy for shareholder protection in general. 
However,  this  is  not  the  case  in  other  countries.  For  example,  although  in 
France and Germany cumulative voting can be provided in the articles,
21 the use 
of cumulative voting does not play any role and even the most elaborate and vo-
luminous books on company law may not discuss it at all.
22 
 
On the other hand, this can be seen from the absence of certain variables in the 
index. The exclusion of the law on removal of directors, in the background of 
the fact that the law on entrenchment of directors in the US is a subject of high 
criticism,
23 points towards a possible US-bias. The focus on protection of share-
holders from directors and the comparative disregard of the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by majority blockholders is another illustration. This fact 
has also been illustrated in a study in which a German scholar
24 constructed an 
‘alternative minority protection index,’
25 on the basis of what he believed to be 
more important rules for (minority) shareholder protection. It is little surprise 
that, on the resultant index, Germany performed better than the US.  
 
Whilst their choice of variables indicate a possible US-bias, their coding has 
been subjected to some pointing criticism on account of a common-law bias. 
The difference between default and mandatory rules has not been sufficiently 
taken into account,
26 so that the random reliance on mandatory law and default 




Finally, the trouble lies with the definitions of some of the variables. Many of 
the La Porta et al variables are too broad or vague. For instance, the variable 
‘proxy voting’ is unsatisfactory because probably all countries have some kind 
of proxy voting.
28 Even fuzzier is the variable ‘oppressed minority’:
29 Given its 
description,
30  it  covers  various  substantive  and  procedural  aspects  of  share-




III. Building a meaningful shareholder protection index  
 
One thing which is conspicuous in the earlier studies is the lack of reflection on 
the difficult topic of choosing the variables and of coding legal rules in any 




Given the problems with the existing studies, we have decided to pass over 






new  shareholder  protection  index  traces  how  shareholder  protection  in  five 
countries has developed over a period exceeding three decades.
33 In this part we 
discuss how we made the choice of variables and decided how ‘the law’ should 
be coded. 
 
1. The variables 
 
The new shareholder protection index of this paper traces how shareholder pro-
tection in the UK, the US, Germany, France, and India has developed in the last 
35 years. In this index we have endeavoured to include variables which best re-
flect the shareholder protection in these countries. To be sure, we do not attempt 
here to include nor do we believe that everything that matters for shareholder 
protection should be considered in an index on shareholder protection. The ef-
fective protection of shareholders is linked with contract law, civil procedure, 
questions of legal effectiveness, as well as social, economic, and cultural differ-
ences. These aspects will be taken into account when our shareholder index will 
be used for a future econometric study.
34 This paper deliberately focuses on a 
diligent coding of those legal rules, which only concern shareholder protection, 
because, for instance, a mixed coding of shareholder rights and rule of law in 
one set of variables would lead to confusion rather than illumination. 
 
The variables, which are used as proxies for shareholder protection in the index, 
are divided into variables which protect shareholders against directors and man-
agers, and variables which protect (minority) shareholders against other share-
holders. Furthermore, many of the variables contain sub-variables. For instance, 
the  overall  variable  ‘power  of  the  general  meeting’  consists  of  seven  sub-
variables which address different issues over which the general meeting may or 
may not have decision-making power, namely, amendments of articles of asso-
ciation, mergers and divisions, capital measures, de facto changes, dividend dis-
tributions, election of board of directors and directors’ self-dealing of substan-
tial transactions. In total, our shareholder protection index has 60 (sub-) vari-
ables whose development has been coded for the five countries. The list of these 
variables and a description of their coding can be found in Annex I. 
 
Some variables used in the existing literature have been disintegrated, modified 
and recast into more precise variables with detailed sub-variables. For instance, 
as observed earlier,
35 the use of the variables ‘proxy voting’ and ‘oppressed mi-
nority’ in the previous studies is too vague. With respect to ‘proxy voting’ it is 
important to distinguish between a variety of aspects, such as, who can be ap-
pointed, whether companies have to facilitate proxy voting, who bears the costs 







36 We have therefore recast it into two separate variables ‘anticipa-
tion  of  shareholder  decision’  and  ‘communication  with  other  shareholders
’, 
which are further divided into meaningful sub-variables.
37 With respect to ‘op-
pressed minority’, we have first of all distinguished between substantive law for 
protection against mismanagement of the directors and managers and fraud on 
minority by or transferring of assets and profits out of firms by majority (or con-
trolling) shareholders for their benefit.
38 Moreover, there are various ways in 
which enforcement may operate, for instance, private-law remedies, interven-
tion by public authorities, and disqualification are equally conceivable. We have 
therefore built separate sub-variables to reflect enforcement.
39 
 
In our choice of variables, we have taken account of the fact that different legal 
instruments can be used to achieve a similar function – the principle of ‘func-
tionality’. For example, there are various ways in which a decision of the gen-
eral meeting may be prevented from harming minority shareholders: rules of 
company law may be mandatory so that the majority shareholder cannot abuse 
their power in the general meeting in this respect;
40 company law may require 
approval of a public authority so that the powers of the majority shareholders 
are restricted;
41 quorum and supermajority requirements may ensure that a sig-
nificant  majority  has  approved  the  decision  in  question;  fiduciary  principles 
may control the voting of the majority shareholder; or appraisal rights may pro-
vide the minority shareholder a way to exit the company for full compensa-
tion.
42 If one of these elements is disregarded, a study which uses quantified le-
gal  variables  for  econometric  purposes  may  be  flawed  because  it  does  not 
measure shareholder protection properly. Similarly, for a leximetric study of 
this nature, important functional equivalents must not be ignored in order to 
provide a coherent and meaningful characterisation of the law. 
 
Finally, it is crucial to consider basic insights of comparative law. A compara-
tive lawyer must not impose one’s own conceptions on a foreign legal system. 
The concept is summed up well in one of the leading comparative law text-
books: ‘Europeans and Americans must be constantly aware, when studying 
non-Western legal systems and cultures, that they must not approach or appraise 
these systems from their Western viewpoints or judge them by European or 
American  standards.  For  example  some  Western  lawyers  concluded  in  the 
1970s  that  China  has  no  legal  system  because  she  has  no  attorneys  in  the 
American or European sense, no independent judiciary, no Codes, and, since the 
Cultural Revolution, no system of legal education. Yet, this is surely to judge a 
non-Western system by Western standards, rather like the Western visitor who 
assumed that there was no “proper” music played in China because he did not 
see any Western instruments in the Chinese concert hall he visited’.






minimise any ‘home bias’, in the construction of our variables we have there-
fore, looked at the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance
44 the compara-
tive literature on company law,
45 as well as the laws of the countries themselves. 
We have also considered that there can be significant differences between de-
veloped counties and developing countries in terms of what are the crucial con-
cerns for protection of shareholders.
46 We have therefore endeavoured in our 
choice of variables to reflect some of the distinctive features of the Indian com-
pany law for the protection of shareholders.
47  
 
2. The coding  
 
Attributing and comparing legal differences by numbers is contrary to the tradi-
tional way of doing comparative law. The use of a quantitative methodology to 
account for variations across legal systems is inevitably reductive, and, as such, 
may be subjected to some searching criticisms.
48 However, we believe that with 
a cautious approach, it has the potential to open new vistas of research in the 
area of comparative law and as such should not be shunned. In fact, this paper 
in Part IV provides an illustration of interesting possibilities that diligent quanti-
fication of legal rules provides for comparing variations across time series and 
across legal systems. 
 
The coding of legal rules is difficult, because law is not a ‘thing’ which can be 
quantified as easily as money, cars, or persons. In this exercise, it is often easier 
to define a variable, we realised, than to actually ascertain the law and code it 
by assigning it a number. It is sometimes a matter of legal judgment.
49 The way 
we have sought to tackle this issue, is to ensure that lawyers trained in the juris-
dictions either did the actual coding or we have sought such experts to validate 
our coding. But as is common knowledge, often lawyers even from the same ju-
risdiction disagree on the position of law. We believe that transparency is a so-
lution to this problem. Being constrained by space here, we have included few 
variables as illustration,
50 but we would be publishing on the internet both our 
coding and our explanatory notes, shortly.  
 
In this interesting and often treacherous journey through the legal systems of 
five different countries, we encountered some difficult patches, for instance, 
where our path reached a fork and we had to chose one of the directions or 
where  our  path  was  hazy  or  not  completely  clear:  throughout  this  exercise 








a) Areas of law 
Our coding concerns shareholder protection only – as opposed to investor pro-
tection in general. We started by looking at company law. However, in some 
cases it was necessary to take securities law into account, because certain as-
pects of the protection of shareholders from directors and majority shareholders 
are sometimes addressed in securities law. An example is the US securities law 
on proxy voting, because the regulation of proxy voting is to a large extent 
regulated in federal securities law.
51 Functionally it does not make a difference 
which area of law addresses a particular topic. We may mention here that while 
coding we have considered law as it applies to the listed companies
52 which also 
goes to explain why we find provisions relevant for some of the variables in se-
curities law. 
 
Because of our focus on rules which address the protection of ‘shareholders as 
such’ and not investors in general, most parts of securities law have not been 
taken into account. For instance, the rules on insider trading, on public disclo-
sure and transparency of financial information, as well as accounting require-
ments are not coded in detail.
53 The prohibition of insider trading aims at pro-
tection of investors and capital markets in general but not specifically at the pro-
tection of ‘shareholders as such’.
54 The disclosure of financial information and 
accounting requirements are general topics which also target the protection of 
bondholders, other lenders, financial markets, and perhaps even the society as a 




b) Mandatory as well as default rules 
 
One of the difficult questions that we had to decide was – to what extent we 
should code not mandatory law alone but default rules as well. In Part I of our 
variables (Annex I) no distinction has been made between default and manda-
tory law. Since these variables address the protection of shareholders against di-
rectors and managers, the thinking is that the shareholders can together prevent 
deviation from a default rule which aims at their protection. Conversely, with 
respect to the protection of shareholders against major shareholders (Part II of 
our variables), there are some variables which only code mandatory law.
56 The 
reason for this is the principle of functionality because mandatory rules can be 
an instrument to protect minority shareholders against tunnelling of the major-
ity.
57 Furthermore, three (sub-) variables address the question of whether minor-
ity shareholders can prevent the majority of shareholders from opting out of the 
protection of shareholders against directors and managers.
58 This is important if 






board act together, because in these cases the protection against board and other 
shareholders is rendered interchangeable. 
 
As far as default rules are concerned, the corporate governance codes and in the 
case of UK and India the Table A of British and Indian company law have also 
been taken into account.
 59 Since all companies in these countries need articles 
of association, the Table A regulations operate as a ‘model off the shelf’. Like-
wise, for listed companies corporate governance codes can be at least as impor-
tant as default rules
60 because non-compliance of corporate governance codes 
may severely hinder corporate finance and thus the very purpose of being listed 
may be impaired. Thus, at least in developed countries  compliance with corpo-
rate governance codes is the rule.
61 
 
We also coded the British City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. Although it is 
not statutory law and legal sanctions are often not available, compliance is the 
rule.
62 Our index takes the City Code into account to provide a meaningful pic-
ture of how shareholders are protected in case of takeovers in the UK. 
 
c) Non-uniform law and listing rules  
 
For federal states coding may lead to a problem if the law on shareholder pro-
tection is not regulated in a uniform way. From amongst our panel countries, 
this was a concern with respect to the US alone.
63 More than half a million 
business entities have their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of 
all  U.S.  publicly-traded  companies  and  58%  of  the  Fortune  500.
64  We  have 
therefore decided to look at the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). 
A related problem exists where there is more than one stock exchange in one 
country. Here we have chosen the dominant stock exchange, for instance the 
NYSE and considered its rules while coding for the US.  
 
Furthermore, it could be problematic that listing rules are sometimes based on 
statutory law and sometimes on self-regulation of the stock exchange. For ex-
ample, in the UK prior to 1985 the listing rules were only the LSE’s own private 
requirements.
65  Since  then  the  listing  rules  have  had  a  statutory  basis,  and, 
moreover, in 2000 the Financial Services and Markets Act shifted the compe-
tence for the listing rules from the LSE to the UK Listing Authority, a compo-
nent of the Financial Services Authority. Similarly, in India the Listing Agree-
ment Form has had statutory force only since 1995.
66 However, from a func-
tional perspective these differences do not matter. Since even in the past listed 
companies could not escape the listing requirements, these self-regulatory rules 







d) Statutory and case law 
 
A particular legal rule can be based on statutory law or case law. With respect to 
case law, a doctrinal approach may be put forward that in common-law coun-
tries case law is regarded as a source of law, whereas in civil law countries court 
decisions are merely seen as a clarification of the existing law.
67 However, our 
index has not distinguished in this respect. Despite the different starting point, 
both in common-law and in civil-law countries, court decisions can bring about 
an effect which is as important as a statutory provision.
68 Thus, following a 
functional approach we have taken into account statutory law as well as court 
decisions and the legal changes brought about by them. 
 
Statutory law has been coded in the year in which it comes into force and case 
law has been coded it in the year in which it is delivered and reported. There are 
certain tricky questions like statutes passed but not yet in force or decisions ei-
ther unpublished or expected,
69 but these are some aspects of the law that cannot 
be considered for coding.  
 
e) Unweighted variables 
 
Another issue that we considered while coding the variables for this study, was 
that of weighting of variables.
70 It is conceivable that not all of our variables 
will have the same significance in all the countries. Naturally, geo-political con-
siderations, economic concerns, or cultural differences may mean that, while 
some of the measures coded here may be more important in some countries, 
they may not be so important in others. However, having considered the option 
of weighting the variables, which poses a difficult question of how much weight 
to be given to each variable in each country – which invariably would have in-
volved subjective elements, we decided in favour of unweighted measures. It is 
arguable therefore that our index does not fully capture the comparative share-
holder  protection.  In  defence  we  yet  again  rely  on  our  functional  approach, 
which has meant that we have taken into account the existence of functional 
equivalents across jurisdictions. This explains the large number of variables! To 
be sure, we do not claim that the variables coded are the only or maximum or 
even optimum rules for protection of shareholders: what we have  attempted 
here is to choose and code for variables that are capable of acting as proxies for 







f) Non-binary coding 
Finally, it had to be decided whether to use binary coding only (0, 1) or non-
binary numbers too (½, ⅓, ¼, ⅔, ⅝ etc.). Against the use of binary coding in 
some of the previous studies it was argued that binary evaluation of legal sys-
tems according to ‘0 or 1’ is a very simplified method to judge the extent of 
shareholder  protection.
71  However,  one  can  equally  criticise  the  use  of  non-
binary coding: whereas the use of ‘0’ and ‘1’ can easily be translated as ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’, the non-binary use of numbers for law can appear to be arbitrary.
72 
 
Here, we decided to use binary as well as non-binary numbers because it is not 
always possible to translate legal rules into ‘yes’-’no’ questions. For instance, 
the statutory law may be ambiguous, or judges may disagree. If no clearly pre-
dominant opinion exists, it is more accurate to code a variable as ‘½’ or some 
other intermediary score than to randomly decide that either the ‘1’ or the ‘0’ 
score is more persuasive. Furthermore, non-binary coding has the advantage 
that more information can be included in a single variable. For example, accord-
ing to our index, the variable which measures the information which sharehold-
ers get in case of amendments of the articles of association ‘equals 1 if the exact 
wording is sent in advance (‘push-system’), equals 0.5 if the shareholders have 
to request it (‘pull-system’), and equals 0 otherwise.’
73 Here it might be ob-
jected that there is no reason why a ‘pull-system’ is exactly half as good as 
‘pull-system’. This is indeed a fair point, and non-binary coding is undeniably 
to some extent a matter of judgment. However, law is complex and we believe 
that a faithful coding should also reflect this very feature of law. Non-binary 




IV. Leximetrics: the results 
 
Using our shareholder protection index, various interesting questions can be ad-
dressed: For instance, it can be asked which country scores the maximum on our 
shareholder protection index; how much these legal systems have changed over 
the years; whether differences follow the distinction into civil-law and common-
law countries; and whether the laws of the five countries are converging or di-
verging. In this Part we consider some of these questions using graphical repre-








1. General shareholder protection aggregate 
At the outset, we simply aggregate all 60 (sub-) variables from our shareholder 
protection index for each of the countries and represent it graphically. The re-
sultant graph is shown in Figure 1: 
 


















a) The five curves in Figure 1 demonstrate some common features. First of all, 
in general, all of them exhibit an upward movement, which means that the ag-
gregate value of the indices increased with time. Thus, legal shareholder protec-
tion has been improving in the last three decades. In particular there is an en-
hancement in shareholder protection in the last five years, which given the re-
cent attention to good corporate governance is hardly surprising. Secondly, at 
times the curves climbed down a few points. This phenomenon, which took 
place particularly in the 1980s and 90s, can be explained by the desire to make 
the law more flexible as it is believed to be more business friendly. For instance, 
in some countries the issuing of stock options without approval of the general 
meeting, the exclusion of pre-emptive rights, or the squeeze out of minority 
shareholders was introduced or became easier.
74 Thirdly, most curves have pla-
teaus and steps. Law often does not change gradually. On the one hand, there 
may be years when a particular part of the law, such as the protection of share-
holders, does not change at all. On the other, a law reform or a bundle of court 
decisions, may lead to amendments of various aspects of shareholder protection 
resulting in a sharp rise in the value of an index in a short while. 
 
b) In addition to the common features above, the curve for each country has 
specific features of its own. In particular, regarding the UK law one can see a 
fairly constant improvement of shareholder protection. The steps in 1980, 1985 
and in the 1990s were caused mainly by the company law reforms and the codes 
of best practice.






ple, the result of the strengthening case law on directors’ duties.
76 The US curve 
looks quite different. As we have coded Delaware corporate law, which is fa-
mous for its ‘light approach’ in regulating the internal affairs of companies,
77 it 
is no surprise that for most part of the time-series the US values are lower than 
the ones of the other countries. To be sure, there were frequent changes in the 
Delaware  General  Corporation  Law
78  as  well  as  important  decisions  of  the 
Delaware courts.
79 However, these events have not led to major reorientations 
of Delaware’s law on shareholder protection. The steep rise in 2002 reflects the 
changes brought about by the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 which led to a strength-
ening of shareholder protection.
80 
 
By contrast, French shareholder protection law shows a remarkable improve-
ment in the late 80s and early 90s,
81 and in these years it was, perhaps surpris-
ingly, clearly more  shareholder friendly than the law of the other countries. 
Then, the curve climbed down a few points during mid-90s, because of the be-
lief that French company law should become more flexible.
82 Similar to the 
other curves, the French curve again follows an upward movement since 1999.
83 
Only in this respect, the German situation is similar to the French. Apart from 
the changes in the late 1990s and early 2000,
84 the German law on shareholder 
protection has been relatively stable. An explanation could be that some of the 
European company law directives of the 70s and early 80s were based on Ger-
man company law.
85 Furthermore, in the 80s and early 90s other legal topics 
such as the reform proposals on the German contract law and insolvency law, 
and problems related to the German unification were at the fore. 
 
Lastly, the Indian curve also shows phases of relative stability
86 and a giant leap 
in 2001. Apart from the developments in the takeover law
87 the shareholder pro-
tection law during the 90s remained largely unchanged.
88 There could be at least 
two possible explanations for this: first, the Indian economy was opening up so 
that there were other areas of law that were deemed to be more crucial for the 
process of liberalisation, which therefore, deserved more attention of the legisla-
tors.
89 Secondly, with the onset of liberalisation the stock market capitalisation 
rose up, shareholding became relatively more dispersed (and included foreign 
investors) so that the issues concerning corporate governance came to the fore 
and  really  gained  significance  only  after  this  initial  period  of  stock  market 
growth. The series of corporate scandals that followed the initial period of liber-
alisation further pressed the need for better corporate governance.
90 This culmi-
nated into adoption of improved corporate governance provisions, which is re-
flected by the gain of significant points around 2001.
91 What emerges therefore, 
from the Indian experience, is a pattern where the law follows rather than leads 
investor expectations as well as economic development.






c) In analysing these differences and developments one cannot help wondering 
whether French law really offers ‘better’ shareholder protection than US law, 
and if so, whether investors should redirect their capital. 
 
The clear answer is that this implication cannot be drawn. First of all, it has to 
be reminded that we coded the law on shareholder protection alone, and have 
not considered other aspects such as financial disclosure, the rule of law or 
socio-economic attitudes, which may also be related to shareholder protection.
93  
Secondly, the extent to and the manner in which shareholders should be pro-
tected can vary in time dependent on a number of factors – such as the extent of 
blockholder control or dispersed share ownership structures, the level of devel-
opment of legal and economic institutions etc. Thus, not the absolute score but 
the legal adaptability of a particular legal system may be more important.
94 In 
this respect it is often said that Delaware has a particular advantage because of 
its judiciary.
95 However, legal adaptability is not restricted to case law alone, 
because, for example, the frequent changes of French company law in the 80s 
were mainly caused by reforms of the codified law.
96  
 
Thirdly, more shareholder protection need not necessarily be better. Company 
law has to balance between different interests so that not a ‘maximum’ but an 
‘optimum’ of shareholder protection has to be found.
97 For example, whilst the 
value of the shareholder protection index for the US has increased considerably 
in the recent years due to the Sarbanes Oxley Act, the changes brought about by 
the Act and its implications have received criticism and some scepticism on 
whether it would actually mean an improvement in corporate governance.
98   
 
A related point, fourthly, is that some of the variables in our index have been 
included and coded because they are relevant for shareholder protection but 
they may actually be unsatisfactory because they excessively restrict compa-
nies.
99 For example, mandatory company law protects minority shareholders, 
because it prevents the majority from changing the articles in order to exploit 
the minority.
100 However, its inflexibility may in the end not only be a problem 
for the majority of the shareholders but may also harm the company in general 
and thus the shareholders as a whole.
101 Another example is the control of ap-
pointment of managers by government or public authority.
102 In a country like 
India where many companies have traditionally been family dominated enter-
prises,  the  majority  shareholders  would  typically  fill  managerial  places  with 
their own kinship. Therefore, control over appointment of managers by the gov-
ernment in the interest of the shareholders can seem to be protective of the 










2. Aggregates of specific groups of variables  
 
In order to get a more meaningful picture than that provided by the general ag-
gregate above it can be useful to deconstruct our index of 60 (sub-)variables and 
look at aggregates of specific groups of variables. One way of doing this is to 
look at the variables which protect shareholders against board and managers on 
the one hand, and the variables that protect minority shareholders against major-
ity shareholders on the other.
104 The result of this can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 
below:
105  





































First, it is conspicuous from Figures 2 and 3 that in all the countries the protec-
tion of shareholders against directors and managers has increased considerably, 
whereas the protection against other shareholders has not changed much.






way to explain this could be that the growing importance of capital markets 
leads to more dispersed shareholder ownership
107 and this increased shareholder 
base may exert pressure to improve primarily the protection of shareholders 
against  directors  and  managers.  Secondly,  distinguishing  between  different 
countries, the protection against other shareholders is more important in block-
holder countries, because here there is the danger that major shareholders ex-
ploit the minority. Given the fact that blockholders often dominate public com-
panies in India, France, and Germany, this could be the reason why these coun-
tries perform better in Figure 3 than the UK and the US, where dispersed share-
holder ownership is more common.
108 Thirdly, however, Figure 2 does not show 
similar  differences  between  blockholder  and  dispersed  ownership  countries. 
This is noteworthy because it refutes the argument that there is an indispensable 
link between dispersed shareholder ownership and strong shareholder protec-
tion.
109 To be sure this does not mean that shareholder protection does not mat-
ter at all in this respect, because a certain level of shareholder protection can 
still be a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for the separation of owner-
ship and control through dispersed holdings.
110 
 
3. Convergence and divergence of the law 
 
At first glance, just looking at Figure 1 (see 1. above), one may get the impres-
sion that in 2001 the laws of the UK, India, France, and Germany were identical 
because all four countries have approximately the same score of 38 out of 60 
variables. This would, however, not be a fair assessment. As Figure 1 simply 
shows the aggregate of all the variables, it is perfectly possible and indeed is the 
case  that,  different  variables  have  led  to  similar  scores  for  the  UK,  India, 
France, and Germany. Therefore to highlight the differences between the coun-
tries with a view to identifying trends of convergence or divergence we have 
calculated the differences between each variable in the law of a particular legal 
system and the same variable in the law of the other countries. Subsequently, 
the absolute values of these differences have been added together and repre-
sented graphically in Figures 4 and 5 below. For example, Figure 4 displays 
four curves that represent the difference between French law and each of the 
other panel countries. The lower the score of a country, the more similar is the 
law of that country to French law. Thus, a country would, for instance, produce 
the score of ‘0’ if it were completely identical to French law, and it would pro-






























   
With respect to the difference the from French law in Figure 4 the most interest-
ing curves are the ones that represent Germany and the UK. One may expect 
that German and French law would be least different because both countries be-
long to the civil-law family and in both countries blockholders have typically 
dominated public companies. This can indeed be confirmed until the late 80s. 
Since then, however, UK law is the least different from French law, because 
French and UK law have converged
111  and French and German law have di-
verged.
112 Path dependencies based on legal families have not prevented this 
development. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that all along the indices for 
the two European countries (UK and Germany) have had values considerably 
more similar to French law values than the two non-European countries (US and 
India). Here again communication between the European countries or even a 
common European legal culture appear to be stronger than the categorisation 







With respect to the difference from UK law in Figure 5, Indian law is least dif-
ferent, then French law, then German law and once again US law is the most 
different. Indian law is predictably similar to UK law, because of its common-
law legal origin. But it has developed certain features of its own to suit its socio-
economic conditions, for example, the law in relation to public enforcement of 
company law
113 and these variables seem to ensure a constant difference be-
tween the two countries for the entire duration of the time-series. Furthermore 
changes in UK law
114 have taken the two countries further away from each other 
during the 90s. But the introduction of corporate governance provisions based 
largely on the UK codes has reduced the difference in the last few years.
115 A 
comparable recent development can also be seen for the other countries. It is 
remarkable,  however,  that  for  almost  the  entire  period  French  law  has  been 
quite similar to UK law and that US law has been very different to it.
116 Our re-
sults therefore contradict any claims to the effect that there are deep differences 




For lack of space the similar outcomes about differences from German, Indian, 
and the US law have not been included in this paper. However, the next two 
figures display differences between all the countries and therefore compensate 
for their absence. Figure 6 shows the mean of all the differences of all five 
countries from every other country. For example, the US curve indicates how 
different US law is from the law of the UK, Germany, France, and India. Once 
again, a score of ‘0’ would mean that it were completely identical and ‘60’ 
would mean that it were completely different. Finally, Figure 7 displays the 
mean of the five curves of Figure 6.  
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The fact that in Figure 6 the US curve has the highest scores means that US law 
has always been more different than the law of the other four countries. The fact 
that the US curve has been climbing down a few points every now and then and 
especially  since  2000  may  indicate  some  Americanisation  of  the  law  of  the 
other countries. Indeed, our data suggests that, in some respect, the law of the 
other countries has become more similar to US law.
118  Equally, with respect to 
some variables US law has become more similar to the law of the other coun-
tries.
119 Moreover, given the continuing differences between US law and the law 
of the other countries, Figure 6 suggests that there is no general Americanisa-
tion of the law on shareholder protection. It is also interesting that UK law has 
always been more ‘mainstream’ i.e. the UK law has been the least different 
from all the other countries than the law of the other countries. The explanation 
for this could be that the UK is both a member of the common-law and the 
European family, and thus influences and/or absorbs different legal traditions. 
Finally, it is remarkable that the curves of the five countries hardly ever overlap 
with each other. The differences in the level of internationality are therefore 
fairly stable. Perhaps this degree to which a country takes foreign ideas into ac-
count is a deep factor of legal culture which does not change considerably over 
time. 
 
The dropping curves in Figure 6 indicate that the law of the five countries is 
converging in the last years. This overall tendency becomes even clearer in Fig-
ure 7. Two points in time are particularly important: 1993/1994 and 2001/2002. 
During 1993/1994, France made its law more flexible (and thus the values of 
variables I 12.2, II 1, 6 dropped), whereas in the UK the Cadbury Code of Best 
Practice was applied (and thus the values of variables I 9.1-3, 12.2, 17 rose). 
This led to a divergence, but in the succeeding years the other countries fol-






vergence has increased significantly since the year 2001/2002. Following the 
burst of the dot-com bubble and the string of corporate scandals at the begin-
ning of the century in many parts of the world, all five countries changed the 
law in a similar pattern. Consequently, Figure 7 indicates that globalisation in 






In this paper we have built a new and meaningful shareholder protection index 
for five countries and coded the development of the law for over three decades. 
Attributing and comparing legal differences by numbers is contrary to the tradi-
tional way of doing comparative law and the use of a quantitative methodology 
to  account  for  variations  across  legal  systems  has  been  subjected  to  some 
searching criticisms.
121 However, we believe that with a cautious approach, it 
has the potential to open new vistas of research in the area of comparative law 
and as such should not be shunned. In fact, this paper provides an illustration of 
the interesting possibilities that diligent quantification of legal rules provides for 
comparing variations across time series and across legal systems.  
 
Our leximetric study has found, first, that in all of the countries studied (UK, 
US, Germany, France, India), shareholder protection has been improving in the 
last 35 years. Secondly, our data shows that the law on shareholder protection in 
the US is weaker than the law of the other four countries.
122 Thirdly, we have 
found that one of the reasons for this is that the protection of minority against 
majority shareholders is considerably stronger in the ‘blockholder countries’ – 
France, Germany, and India. Fourthly, our examination of the legal differences 
between the five countries does not confirm the distinction between common 
law and civil law countries. Our results therefore suggest that on diligent coding 
of shareholder protection law based on a meaningful shareholder protection in-
dex in particular taking into account functional equivalents of legal instruments 
for protection – the claims that there are deep differences between shareholder 
protection in the Civil Law and the Common Law legal origin countries seem to 
wither away. Finally, we found that convergence in shareholder protection has 
been taking place since 1993 and has increased considerably since 2001. 
 
It should be noted that we have not examined whether a better ‘score’ in our 
shareholder protection index does matter for good corporate governance and ul-
timately for economic development of a country. It could be the case that more 
shareholder protection hinders companies
123 and thus has a contrary effect. We 






constitute a basis for an econometric study combining financial data to find sta-
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The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of the 
general meeting and 1 if there is a power of the general meet-
ing.. 
(1)  Amendments of articles of association 
(2)  Mergers and divisions 
(3)  Capital measures
3 
(4)  De facto changes: The decisive thresholds are the sale 
of subtantial assets of the company (e.g., if the sale of more 
than 50 % requires approval of the general meeting it equals 
1; if more than 80 %, it equals 0.5; and otherwise 0). 
(5)  Dividend distributions: Equals 1 if the general meeting 
can effectively influence the amount of dividend (e.g., if it de-
cides about the annual accounts and the annual dividend, and 
if the board has no significant possibility of ‘manipulating’ the 
accounts); equals 0.5 if there is some participation of the gen-
eral meeting; equals 0 if it is only the board that decides about 
the dividend. 
(6)  Election of board of directors 







(1)  General topics: Equals 1 if shareholders who hold 1 % 
or less of the capital can put an item on the agenda; equals 0.5 
if  there  is  a  hurdle of  more  than  1  %  but  less  than  10  %; 
equals 0 otherwise. 
(2)  Election of directors: ditto 
(3)  Costs: Equals 1 if shareholders do not have to pay for 







(1)  Right:  Equals  1  if  the  minimum  percentage  of  share 
capital  to  demand  an  extraordinary  meeting  is  less  than  or 
equal to 5 %; equals 0.5 if it is more than 5 % but less or equal 






(2)  Enforcement:  Equals  1  if  shareholders  can  call  the 
meeting themselves or have a right that the court will enforce 





(1)  Restrictions on proxy voting: Equals 0 if there are re-
strictions on who can be appointed or which rights the proxy 
has so that it is likely that proxy voting does usually not take 
place; equals 0.5 if there are some restrictions which reduce 
the relevance of proxy voting; equals 1 if there are no restric-
tions. 
(2)  Anticipation  facilitated:  Equals  1  if  postal  voting  or 
proxy solicitation with two-way voting proxy form has to be 
provided by the company; equals 0.5 if two-way proxy form 
has to be provided but not proxy solicitation; equals 0 other-
wise. 
(3)  Costs of proxy contest: Equals 1 if the costs of proxy 
solicitations are paid by the company or if proxies have the 
right to have their proposals included in the company’s proxy 
form; equals 0 otherwise. 
 
5. Information 
in the run-up of 
the general 
meeting 
(1)  Amendments of the articles of association: Equals 1 if 
the exact wording has to be sent in advance (‘push-system’); 
equals  0.5  if  the  shareholders  have  to  request  it  (‘pull-
system’); equals 0 otherwise.  
(2)  Mergers: Equals 1 if a special report has to be sent in 
advance (‘push-system’); equals 0.5 if the shareholders have 
to request it (‘pull-system’); equals 0 otherwise.  
 




Equals 0 if shareholders have to deposit their shares prior to 
the  general  meeting  and  if  this  has  the  consequence  that 
shareholders  are  prevented  from  selling  their  shares  for  a 





(1)  Right to demand information (1): equals 1 if an individ-
ual shareholder or shareholders with 5 % or less capital can 
demand  information  which  will  be  answered  at  the  general 
meeting; equals 0.5 if shareholders with 10% or less capital 
have this right; equals 0 otherwise. 
(2)  Right to demand information (2): equals 1 if an individ-
ual shareholder or shareholders with 5 % or less capital can 






equals 0.5 if shareholders with 10% or less capital have this 






(1)  Right to access the register of shareholders and (if nec-
essary) beneficial owners: Equals 1 if the right of inspection 
can be used by a single shareholder; equals 0 if there is no 
such right. 
(2)  Equals  1  if  communication  is  not  affected  by  proxy 





(1)  Division between management and control: Equals 1 if 
there is a two-tier system or at least half of the board members 
are  non-executive;  equals  0.5  if  at  least  25%  of  the  board 
members are non-executive; equals 0 otherwise.  
(2)  Independent board members:
6 Equals 1 if at least half of 
the board members must be independent; equals 0.5 if at least 
25 % of them must be independent or if the independence re-
quirement is very low; equals 0 otherwise. 
(3)  Committees: Equals 1 if companies have to install an 
audit and a remuneration committee with a majority of inde-
pendent members; intermediate scores are possible if the re-
quirement is partial, (for instance requires setting up of one of 
the committees or the independent members of the committees 
constitute less than a majority); equals 0 if committees are not 









(1)  General meeting power:
7 Equals 1 if the general meet-
ing has to approve all compensation schemes; equals 0.5 if 
this is limited (e.g., applies to stock option plans only, or if 
some directors are excluded); equals 0 otherwise. 
(2)  Annual disclosure: Equals 1 if there is full and specific 
disclosure about the individual remuneration of each director; 
equals 0.75 if there is information about the individual remu-
neration of some directors; equals 0.5 if there is disclosure 
about the top 2 directors (executives); equals 0.25 if there is 
only disclosure about the overall remuneration; equals 0 oth-
erwise. 
(3)  Substantive requirements placing limit for remuneration 
in order to protect shareholders: Equals 1 if there is a direct 










Equals 1 if performance based remuneration of directors and 
managers is fostered (e.g. facilitation of stock options to re-
ward performance); equals 0 otherwise.  
 
12. Duration of 
director’s ap-
pointment 
(1)  Normal duration: Equals 1 if this is one year or less; 0 if 
this is five years or more; equals 0.5 if this is more than 1 but 
less than 5 years . 
(2)  Dismissal feasible: Equals 1 if there are no special re-
quirements; equals 0 if an important reason is required; equals 







(1)  Directors’ liability - duty of care: Equals 0 if there are 
narrow criteria which virtually exclude liability; equals 0.5 if 
there  are  some  restrictions  (e.g.,  business  judgement  rule; 
gross negligence); equals 1 if there are no or little restrictions 
(regarding business judgement and standard of care).  
(2)  Directors’ liability - duty of loyalty: Equals 1 if there is 
a  duty  not  to  put  personal  interests  ahead  of  the  company; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
(3)  Private  enforcement:  Equals  0  if  this  is  typically  ex-
cluded (e.g., because of strict subsidiarity requirement, hurdle 
which is at least 10 %; cost rules); equals 0.5 if there are some 
restrictions  [e.g.,  certain  percentage  of  share  capital  (unless 
the hurdle is at least 10 %); cost rules; demand requirement]; 




(1)  General principle: Equals 1 if the board always has to 
give priority to shareholders interests; equals 0 if the board 
have  to  give  priority  to  the  interests  of  other  stakeholders; 
equals 0.5 in other cases. 
(2)  Takeover law: Equals 1 if there is the principle of strict 
neutrality in case of takeovers; equals 0.5 if the principle of 






Equals 1 when the law grants shareholders the first opportu-
nity to buy new issues of shares, and this right can be waived 
only by the general meeting;
11 equals 0 otherwise. 
 






disqualification  if directors are disqualified only in specific instances of negli-
gence (e.g., failure of financial reporting); equals 0 if negli-






Equals 1 if companies have to disclose and explain whether 
they comply with a corporate governance code; equals 0.5 if 





The following variables equal 0 if there is no power of public 
authority and 1 if public authority has power. 
(1)  Authorisation for director’s self dealing of substantial 
transactions 
(2)  Authorisation for appointment of managers 
(3)  Power to intervene in cases of prejudice to public inter-
est or interest of the company for instance due to ‘misman-











12  Equals  1  if  there  is  a  50  %  quorum  for  the  extraordinary 
shareholder  meeting  (when  it  is  called  for  the  first  time); 
equals 0.5 if the quorum is 1/3; equals 1/4 if the quorum is 





Equals 1 if there are supermajority requirements (e.g., 2/3 or 
3/4) for amendments of the articles of association, mergers, 
and voluntary liquidations; equals 0 if they do not exist at all. 
 




(1)  Default rule: Equals 1 if this principle exists as a default 
rule; equals 0 otherwise. 
(2)  Prohibition  of  multiple  voting  rights  (super  voting 
rights): Equals 1 if there is a prohibition; equals 2/3 if only 
companies which already have multiple voting rights can keep 
them; equals 1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 oth-
erwise. 






ings):  Equals  1  if there  is  a  prohibition;  equals  2/3  if only 
companies  which  already  have  voting  caps  can  keep  them; 
equals 1/3 if state approval is necessary; equals 0 otherwise. 




Equals 1 if shareholders can cast all their votes for one candi-
date standing for election to the board of directors or if there 
exists a mechanism of proportional representation in the board 
by which minority interests may name a proportional number 
of directors to the board (default or mandatory law); equals 0 
otherwise. 
 





Equals 1 if a shareholder cannot vote if this vote favours him 
or her personally (i.e., only ‘disinterested shareholders’ can 
vote); equals 0 otherwise.  
6. No squeeze 
out (freeze out) 
 
Equals 0 if a shareholder holding 90 % or more can ‘squeeze 
out’ the minority; equals 1 otherwise. 
 
 
7. Right to exit  (1)  Appraisal  rights:  Equals  1  if  they  exist  for  mergers, 
amendments of the articles and sales of major company assets; 
equals 0 if they do not exist at all. 
(2)  Mandatory bid: Equals 1 if there is a mandatory bid for 
the entirety of shares in case of purchase of 30% or 1/3 of the 
shares; equals 0 otherwise. 
(3)  Mandatory public offer: Equals 1 if there is a manda-
tory public offer for purchase of 10% or less of the shares; 
equals 0.5 if the acquirer has to make a mandatory public of-
fer for acquiring more than 10% of the shares; equals 0 other-
wise. 
 




Equals 1 if shareholders who acquire at least 3 % of the com-
panies capital have to disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 
5 % of the capital; equals 0.5 if this concerns 10 %; equals 
0.25 if this concerns 25 %; equals 0 otherwise  
9. Oppressed 
minority 
(1)  Substantive law: Equals 0 if majority decisions of the 
general meeting have to be accepted by the outvoted minority; 
equals 1 if some kind of substantive control is possible (e.g., 






tion of management misconduct, exclusion of the pre-emption 
right, related parties transactions, freeze outs); equals 0.5 if 
this control covers only flagrant abuses of majority power. 
(2)  Shareholder action: Equals 1 if every shareholder can 
file a claim against a resolution by the general meeting be-
cause he or she regards it as void or voidable; equals 0.5 if 
there are hurdles such as a threshold of at least 10 % voting 
rights or cost rules; equals 0 if this kind of shareholder action 







(1)  Exclusion of directors duty of care (see variable I 13.1) 
in articles: equals 0 if possible and equals 1 otherwise. 
(2)  Rules on duration of director’s appointment (see vari-
able  I 12.1 and 2): equals 1 if mandatory and 0 otherwise. 
(3)  Board composition (supervisory boards, non-executive 
directors) (see variable  I 9.1 and 2): equals 1 if mandatory 
and 0 otherwise. 
(4)  Other topics: equals 1 if there is the general rule that 
company  law  is  mandatory;  equals  0  if  company  law  is  in 





1 Even where the description of the variables does not mention so specifically, 
we have given intermediate scores wherever necessary. See III. 2 (f), above on 
non-binary coding. 
2 For the power of the general meeting for remuneration see variable I 10.1. 
3 The possibility of authorised capital does not lead to a reduction from 1 to 0.5 
because the default rule does not change. 
4 Variables I. 2 and 3 could also be used as mechanisms for protecting minority 
from majority shareholders. However,  in this study we have considered them as 
part of protection against directors because the directors are responsible for and 
decide the agenda and the calling of the shareholders meetings and therefore the 
legal rules of these variables primarily protect shareholders against directors. 
5  See note 4 above. 
6 To be sure, independent board members may also be a method to protect mi-
nority shareholders against majority shareholders. This depends, however, on 
the definition of ‘independence’, which is not coded in this variable. 








8 For approval of directors’ conduct by the general meeting, the supervisory 
board, or independent board members see variables I 1, 9; for exclusion of li-
ability in the articles see variable II 10.1. 
9 For preventive measures see, e.g., variable II 3. 
10 Usually, the directors decide about the issuance of new shares. Pre-emptive 
right  is  perceived  as  an  important  protection  against  directors  as  it  prevents 
them from disregarding the interests of shareholders in general. Of course, in 
some  cases  this  may  also  be  a  method  to  protect  minority  against  majority 
shareholders. 
11 For the requirements for a waiver (e.g., supermajority, good reason) see vari-
ables II 2, 9. 
12 The purpose of requiring a substantial percentage of shareholders to constitute 
a valid quorum could be to prevent decisions of the general meeting which are 
not supported by a significant majority much like the supermajority require-
ments. But see also Part IV 1c and note 99, above. 
13 Preference shares without voting rights are not addressed because they are 
feasible in all countries. 
14 Note: Variables II 10.1-3 do not code the content of the law (this is already 
done in variables I 9.1-2, 12, 13.1) but only its nature, i.e. whether ‘mandatory’ 











  70  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  80  81 
1
2  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
1
3  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
1
4  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
0
5  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
½
6  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½  ½ 
1
7  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
I 1 
1





1 Main laws on shareholder protection: Loi no 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966 sur les 
sociétés  commerciales  (in  2000  repealed);  since  Ordonnance  No.  2000-912 
company  law  is  (again)  regulated  in  the  Code  de  Commerce  (subsequently 
amended,  e.g.,  by  Loi  sur  les  nouvelles  régulations  économiques  (NRE)  no 
2001-420 du 15 mai 2001); Décret no 67-236 sur les sociétés commerciales (as 
amended); Règlement général de l’Autorité des marchés financiers 2004; Code 
monétaire et financier 2000; Principes de gouvernement d’entreprise résultant 
de la consolidation des rapports conjoints de l’AFEP (Association Française des 
Entreprises  Privées)  et  du  MEDEF  (Mouvement  des  Entreprises  de  France) 
2003 (French Corporate Governance Principles). 
2 Loi 1966, art. 153; Code de Commerce 2000, art. L. 225-96. 
3 Loi 1966, art. 376; Code de Commerce 2000, art. L. 236-9. 
4 Loi 1966, arts. 180, 215; Code de Commerce 2000, arts. L. 225-129, 225-204. 
5 There is no explicit provision on sale of major parts of company assets. It is 
debated, first, whether a de facto measure constitutes a change in the object of 
business (as indicated in the articles), for which the general meeting is compe-
tent. Second, it is argued that the major assets can be equated with the whole as-
sets (Loi 1966, art. 396 (no.4); Code de Commerce 2000, art. L. 237-8(no.4)) 
(see generally, Siems, supra note 45, at 217). Since these cases are exceptions, 
and since there is no case law, deviation from the “0” score would, however, not 
be justified. 
6 The general meeting decides both approval of the annual accounts and the dis-








232-11, 232-12). However, there is some room for manoeuvre due to account-
ing law. Furthermore, interim dividends are possible (Loi 1966, art. 347; Code 
de Commerce 2000, arts. L. 232-12, Décret 1967, art. 200). 
7 Loi 1966, arts. 90, 134; Code de Commerce 2000, arts. L. 225-18, 225-75. 
8 Loi 1966, arts. 101 though 103; Code de Commerce 2000, arts. L. 225-38 
though 40 (but not if normal terms and conditions). 